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Abstract
The food, tobacco and alcohol industries have penetrated markets in low- and middle-income countries
(LMICs), with a significant impact on these countries’ burden of noncommunicable diseases (NCDs).
Tangcharoensathien and colleagues describe the aggressive marketing of unhealthy food, alcohol and tobacco in
LMICs, as well as key tactics used by these industries to resist laws and policies designed to reduce behavioural
risk factors for NCDs. This commentary expands on the recommendations made by Tangcharoensathien
and colleagues for preventing or managing conflicts of interest and reducing undue industry influence on
NCD prevention policies and laws, focusing on the needs of LMICs. A growing body of research proposes
ways to design voluntary industry initiatives to make them more effective, transparent and accountable, but
governments should also consider whether collaboration with health-harming industries is ever appropriate.
More fundamentally, mechanisms for identifying, managing and mitigating conflicts of interest and reducing
industry influence must be woven into – and supported by – broader governance and regulatory structures at
both national and international levels.
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y 2040, low- and middle-income countries (LMICs)
will experience a dramatic rise in disabilities, illness,
and premature deaths from noncommunicable
diseases (NCDs), such as cancer, diabetes, and cardiovascular
or respiratory diseases.1 The epidemiological transition from
communicable (and neonatal, maternal, and nutritional)
diseases to NCDs in LMICs is driven by demographic trends,
principally aging and economic development.1 Modifiable
risk behaviours such as unhealthy diets, alcohol consumption,
physical inactivity and tobacco use also fuel the rise of NCDs,
driven in turn by hyper-urbanization, rapid economic growth,
rising levels of disposable income, and other economic and
socio-cultural changes associated with globalization.1-3
Beyond these drivers of NCDs lies the growing market
penetration in LMICs by the food, tobacco and alcohol
industries, accompanied by the aggressive marketing of
these products – as described by Tangcharoensathien and
colleagues.2-4
The growing burden of NCDs threatens not just individual
and population-level health, but also national healthcare
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systems and social and economic development. This is
recognized by the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda: one
of the targets for Sustainable Development Goal 3 (on ensuring
health and promoting wellbeing) is reducing premature
mortality from NCDs by one third by 2030.5 Innovative,
cost-effective, and adequately funded healthcare systems are
important to responding to the rise in NCDs in LMICs and
for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.1 Equally
important are comprehensive national prevention strategies,
including legal, regulatory, and fiscal capacities such as taxes
on sugar-sweetened beverages (now introduced in over 40
countries worldwide),6 excise taxes to discourage alcohol
purchasing and consumption, and mandatory warning labels
on cigarette packets, alcoholic beverages, and unhealthy foods
and drinks, with some countries currently exploring graphic
warning labels for sugary beverages.7-9 Tangcharoensathien
and colleagues aptly describe a major challenge faced by
LMICs in robustly regulating multinational corporations,
namely industry’s undue influence on law and policymaking.4 The authors in this commentary discuss strategies
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for ameliorating industry interference and conflicts of
interest in the design and implementation of NCD prevention
measures.
Industry Influence on NCD Law and Policy-Making
The large, multinational companies that dominate the
processed food, alcohol, and tobacco industries are described
as “vectors” of the NCD epidemic.2 Their most obvious role as
disease vectors lies in the manufacture, sale and marketing of
products that are harmful to health. Beyond this, the alcohol,
tobacco and food industries exert a powerful influence on
laws and policies that address the behavioural risk factors for
NCDs.
Tangcharoensathien and colleagues describe key tactics
used by “Big” Food, Tobacco, and Alcohol to weaken or
forestall NCD prevention measures, including litigating
against strong public health interventions, using front groups
to counter public health recommendations, funding and
influencing research favourable to industry interests, and
gaining preferential access to policy-making processes by
building relationships with health leaders and legislators.4
Industry uses a range of other tools to influence policies
harmful to its economic interests, including pre-emption of
state, provincial, or local laws to prevent NCDs; adopting
self-regulation or voluntary measures to stave off stronger
statutory regulation9,10; and shaping public dialogue on NCD
causation, promoting discourses of individual choice, personal
responsibility, and the “Nanny State,” while resisting sciencebased interventions that facilitate shared responsibility and
government action on NCDs.11 In addition, industry actors
tend to set their own targets or metrics for what they are
willing to achieve in NCD prevention, rather than adopting
more stringent best-practice targets recommended by national
governments or the World Health Organization (WHO).
As the authors note, all three industries use a “playbook” of
similar tactics to avert effective public health interventions,12
with a growing body of evidence demonstrating their use in
emerging as well as developed countries.2,13,14
Should Policy Actors Engage With Health Harming Industries?
The negative influence of health-harming industries on NCD
prevention raises questions about whether public officials
should ever engage with industry and, if they do, how to
manage conflicts of interest and undue industry influence.
The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control strictly
forbids engagement with the tobacco industry.15 States parties
must take steps to protect tobacco policy-making from
industry interference (FCTC, article 5.3). Should the same
strict standards apply to Big Food and Alcohol?
Governments often explicitly or tacitly encourage selfregulation by the food and alcohol industries (including
by doing nothing or remaining complicit), or join with
industry actors in collaborative initiatives and public-private
partnerships that have NCD prevention objectives. Yet a
significant body of evidence shows that self-regulatory or
collaborative initiatives have been largely ineffective in
achieving public health objectives,16 and some researchers
question whether credible and effective engagement with the

food and alcohol industries is ever possible. These authors
point to an inherent conflict of interest between NCD
prevention and the profit-making imperative of businesses
selling unhealthy products, as well as the often-significant
power imbalance between large, multinational companies
and national governments.11,17
In relation to the food industry, a more nuanced position
may be to identify and assess the variety of actors and modes
of engagement that are possible, rather than to propose a
blanket ban on all forms of engagement. WHO’s guidance
document on preventing and managing conflicts of interest
in nutrition policy-making and implementation lists a sixstep process of risk assessment, balancing, and mitigation.18
The six steps include: clearly identifying the public health
nutrition goal to be achieved through engagement with nonstate actors; profiling, due diligence and risk assessment
(including assessing non-state actors against exclusionary
criteria); balancing the risks and benefits of engagement;
risk management (including identifying the risk profile of
external actors and the form that engagement would take,
and introducing mitigation measures where engagement
is considered appropriate); monitoring, evaluation and
accountability; and transparency and communication.
While this document provides a detailed pathway for risk
management and mitigation, for many in civil society, any
engagement with the food and alcohol industries is fraught
with conflicts that cannot be managed.
In relation to the alcohol industry, a stronger case can be
made that engagement is never appropriate, given the status
of alcohol as “no ordinary commodity,” that alcohol cannot
be said to be crucial to human health and existence in the
same way as (some) foods, and the lack of any evidence that
collaboration with the alcohol industry leads to public health
benefits.19,20
Managing Conflicts of Interest and Holding Industry
Accountable
A growing body of research documents ways to make
engagement with industry more effective, accountable and
transparent.10,21,22 If governments plan to work with industry
on self-regulatory or voluntary initiatives, they must take firm
measures to avoid harmful or unjust results. Table describes
specific recommendations for improving the effectiveness
and accountability of such initiatives (adapted from Reeve23
and WHO18). In addition, strong government leadership
is essential: governments should lead processes of policy
development and create a policy or legislative framework that
sets targets for action against which progress can be measured
and policy coherence maintained.24 Such legislation could also
include principles to govern the implementation of publicprivate partnerships, including the clear identification and
mitigation of any conflicts of interest.24 Further, governments
should (credibly) threaten legislation if voluntary or
collaborative initiatives fail to meet public health objectives.22
Civil society organizations and non-government watchdog
groups play a critical role in advocating for strong NCD
prevention measures and in monitoring both industry
and government efforts, thereby holding both sectors
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Table. Recommendations for Creating Effective, Transparent and Accountable Forms of Voluntary or Collaborative Initiatives With Industry

Component

Recommendation

Developing objectives/policies

Consultation with a broad range of interests.

Objectives

Clear, measurable objectives set by government, against which the scheme’s success or failure can be assessed.

Terms and conditions

Key definitions are clear, conditions and roles are set by government, and are expansive or demanding enough to meet
set objectives.

Administration

Fair and transparent administration by an accountable, independent body, with the roles and responsibilities of each
member clearly described.

Monitoring

A comprehensive, transparent, and independent monitoring system that can be used to evaluate the initiative and
which includes baseline data, as well as a set of measurable, time-bound process and outcome indicators. The results of
monitoring and evaluation exercises are made publicly available, to enhance transparency and accountability to external
stakeholders. Public reporting should include information on the outcomes of the initiative.

Enforcement

A wide range of enforcement options are available, including both incentives and deterrents, as well as an effective,
accessible complaints-handling mechanism where appropriate.

Review

Regular, independent reviews of the scheme’s operation, using baseline data and performance indicators, with reports
from reviews made publicly available.

accountable for commitments and responsibilities. Voluntary
or collaborative initiatives could potentially be strengthened
by enabling non-governmental organisation participation
on an equal footing with government and industry, and by
granting civil society actors powers to monitor and enforce
such initiatives.25
Tangcharoensathien and colleagues argue that a
comprehensive strategy for managing conflicts of interest
requires more than just the careful design of initiatives.
Addressing industry influence and ensuring the effectiveness
of voluntary or collaborative measures requires strengthening
governance institutions more broadly and ensuring that
political and regulatory processes are democratic and free
from corruption or capture.4 At a national level this could
include legislation requiring the disclosure of information by
lobbyists in the form of a register, recusal of public officials
from functions where they have a conflict of interest,18 and
ensuring adequate funding for government institutions and
regulatory agencies.
Emerging countries in particular may require technical and
financial support from national and international actors to
assist them in managing industry influence or interference
with NCD prevention measures. For example, the beverage
industry has invested substantial funds in defeating sugarsweetened beverage taxes through litigation, which may have
a “regulatory chill” effect, particularly in LMICs without
the legal or financial resources to defend such challenges.26
Understanding how to defend these cases and having
the financial capacity to do so can help ward off industry
influence.26 This is illustrated by Bloomberg Philanthropies’
(and partners’) support for the Uruguayan government in
successfully defending its tobacco control laws against a legal
challenge by Philip Morris International under international
trade law.27 Support for LMICs could be enabled by the
sharing of best practice between countries on defending
litigation and on managing conflicts of interest.26 Litigation
and other complaints-handling mechanisms can also be used
by countries themselves to hold industry accountable for
the harms caused by their products and to vindicate healthrelated rights, as with tobacco litigation in the United States.9
452

The Importance of International Governance Frameworks
International governance can help or hinder governments in
managing conflicts of interest and eliminating inappropriate
industry influence on policy-making. To date, the WHO
has taken a vague and inconsistent stance on managing
conflicts of interest and engaging with industry.28 A strong
stance is evident in the WHO’s Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control; in comparison, the Strategy on Diet, Physical
Activity and Health envisages industry participation in
activities related to diet, physical activity and health (“thus
formalising institutional conflicts of interest”),28,29 while the
Global Strategy to Reduce Harmful Use of Alcohol says little on
conflicts of interest and encourages “economic operators” to
consider voluntary or self-regulatory action.30
Recent documents evidence a more cautious stance, as
with the WHO’s guidance document on managing conflicts
of interest in nutrition policy (discussed above),18 and its
Framework on Engaging with Nonstate Actors.31 The WHO
Global Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of NCDs
2013-2020 also requires Member States to protect NCD
prevention policies from undue influence by vested interests
and to acknowledge and manage real, perceived or potential
conflicts of interest.32 However, there is scope to further
clarify and operationalise the WHO’s stance on engaging with
health-harming industries,28 particularly in relation to the
alcohol industry.
Human rights instruments may support the efforts of
national governments to reduce industry influence on lawand policy-making. Most countries have ratified at least one
international agreement that recognizes the right to health
and/or other health-related rights (eg, the right to food),
such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights.9 Under this international treaty, States Parties
have an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the right to
health, which includes preventing corporate human rights
violations.9 Treaty monitoring bodies have recommended
that states take legal and policy measures to address NCDs in
reports issued as part of country periodic review processes;
such recommendations could strengthen the position of
countries counteracting litigation from food, tobacco or
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alcohol companies.9
In contrast to human rights legislation, international trade
and investment agreements potentially restrict the ability of
states to protect NCD laws and policies from industry influence.
They also provide industry actors with an avenue to provide
input into public health policy-making and to challenge
legislation via national and international litigation.9,33 For
example, Philip Morris unsuccessfully challenged Australia’s
tobacco plain packaging laws under an international
investment agreement between Australia and Hong Kong
(and also challenged the constitutionality of these laws in
Australia’s domestic court system). Such cases illustrate that
international investment agreements may expose countries to
legal liability when introducing new laws on NCD prevention,
risking “regulatory chill.”34 Trade liberalization also fosters
foreign direct investment by companies such as Coca-Cola in
emerging markets in LMICs, which is anticipated to increase
consumption of unhealthy food and beverages, and to create
tensions between government measures to encourage such
investment and NCD prevention policies.34
It is crucial for the public health community to be active
in trade and investment policy processes, and for national
governments to avoid agreements that overly constrain their
ability to introduce public health laws and policies.34 Other
helpful measures include strengthening the global governance
of NCDs, eg, by the WHO creating new, legally binding
standards on nutrition and reducing harmful consumption of
alcohol (which could be used as a reference in trade dispute
arbitration), as well as specific language in new trade and
investment agreements requiring consideration of WHOapproved action plans or recommendations in any dispute
with NCD prevention implications.33
Countering Industry’s Pervasive Influence on NCD Policies
A large body of research documents the ways in which the
food, tobacco, and alcohol industries attempt to influence
law and policy-making to prevent NCDs, including in LMICs
– a rapidly growing market for health-harming products.
Researchers and international organisations such as the WHO
are paying increasing attention to ways in which conflicts
of interest can be avoided or managed, as well as reducing
industry influence on policy-making. Active consideration
should be given to whether engagement with food and
alcohol industry actors should be excluded altogether. Where
governments do engage with industry, self-regulatory or
collaborative initiatives can be designed to improve their
transparency, accountability, and effectiveness. However, a
comprehensive approach to reducing inappropriate industry
influence requires that rigorous conflicts of interest rules
must be woven into – and supported by – broader governance
structures at national and international levels.
The undue influence of “Big” Food, Alcohol and Tobacco is
far from a theoretical matter. These industries are responsible
for millions of preventable deaths and countless suffering. If
multinational corporations fail to exercise social responsibility,
it is incumbent on governments – and global health bodies –
to compel them to do so.
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